A Security Guarantee for Saudi Arabia Will End Poorly

Recent U.S. efforts to formulate a “miracle deal” establishing diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia stress the limits of imagination. In the Middle East, a restless region where many initiatives fail, Washington seems prepared to run afoul of its own interests. The reported agreement’s terms — especially a U.S. security commitment to Saudi Arabia that’s reportedly on par with those with Japan and South Korea — would further entrench the United States in Middle Eastern quagmires, committing valuable U.S. resources to a region of diminishing importance to U.S. national security interests. 

For the Israelis and Saudis to normalize relations, the Biden administration is reportedly offering significant concessions to Riyadh. The details include arms sales to the Kingdom, a U.S. security guarantee, and support for a domestic civilian nuclear program. The security guarantee reportedly involves both nations coming to each other’s defense if attacked. Israel would provide concessions on the Palestinian issue to the Saudis, which Palestinian officials have said must be “irreversible.”

Washington appears ready to invest significant resources to achieve this deal, viewing it as groundbreaking and necessary to balance against real and perceived threats from Iran, and to counter China’s increasing influence in the region. In this context, Biden administration officials likely find it critical to retain regional influence to prevent a conflict that would send energy markets spiraling, threaten Israel, and produce another migration crisis.

The Biden administration hopes to pursue an offshore balancing strategy, in which a great power uses favored regional partners to check a hostile actor. As such, Washington hopes to achieve a smaller footprint by balancing the region’s powers against Iran to avoid conflict, mainly via the Abraham Accords. The issue at hand, however, is that successive U.S. administrations have misunderstood the offshore balancing approach within the Middle Eastern geopolitical context.

Historically, Saudi Arabia is risk-tolerant, opting for interventionist actions that have destabilized the region. Its war with Houthi rebels in Yemen exemplifies this dynamic, even under the informal ceasefire that expired last October. Riyadh continues to be a leader of the counterrevolutionary movement that started after the Arab Spring and has overthrown governments from Egypt to Sudan. The Kingdom’s decision to murder Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey, support problematic anti-Iran groups, and efforts to harass, detain, disappear and torture American citizens, expatriates of other nations, and dissidents speaks to its willingness to make risky decisions that carry repercussions.

Thus, a formal East Asia security pact model with the Saudis should raise serious concerns. Given Riyadh’s willingness to interfere with its neighbors and desire to dominate the Middle East and Islamic world, alongside its leadership’s brazen decision-making, it is reasonable and responsible to question whether a future conflict could drag Washington further into regional issues unrelated to its national interests. A formal security relationship would be the opposite of an offshore balancing strategy, increasing the risk of conflict in the region.

Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Iran is central to this dynamic. The two countries are experiencing a moment of détente, following a tumultuous decade of poor relations. A China-brokered deal led both states to re-establish relations and begin working out differences, ultimately producing significant regional shifts in 2023. This agreement is fragile and both states will remain wary of each other for quite some time.

As such, a U.S.-Saudi Arabia security pact with clear anti-Iran connotations would disrupt the slow rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran. The Kingdom’s decision to normalize relations with Israel — Iran’s other regional nemesis — would lead the Islamic Republic to conclude that the region’s powers are deepening their isolation strategy against it. Iran’s leadership would condemn Riyadh for forsaking its role as the Islamic world’s leader — a serious accusation that would resonate with Muslims globally. As a result, the Saudi-Iranian relationship would risk collapsing again, with major regional security implications considering both countries use aggressive, malign actions to regularly violate each other’s sovereignty.

Any Saudi nuclear program, amidst broadened U.S. arms sales, only worsens the risk of conflict in this context; it could spur an arms race that would prime the region for war. Should Riyadh begin a nuclear program because of this trilateral agreement, Tehran and the Kingdom’s neighbors could opt to develop nuclear weapons in a region regularly in conflict. This is particularly true as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has previously threatened to produce nuclear weapons. A regional arms race would only heighten the temperature across the region, increasing the chance of war and U.S. involvement in it.

Washington should avoid this scenario. At any moment, a security pact could obligate U.S. citizens to defend an autocratic security partner in an avoidable war due to that partner’s interest in risky foreign policy decisions and historically poor relations with Iran. It is difficult to identify what U.S. interests would be achieved in such a deal when considering the associated risks.

To be sure, Washington benefits from regional actors engaging each other. It also benefits from offshore balancing efforts that are sustainable. These factors are necessary for any U.S. withdrawal from the region — something that must occur for the United States to address other pressing domestic and international issues. But offering massive concessions to second and third parties to normalize in the name of a faux regional “peace” that could seriously undermine a valid, China-led détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia is anything but a Middle East peace. Rather, it is entrenchment in defense of bad actors.

Alexander Langlois (@langloisajl) is a foreign policy analyst with the International Republican Institute focused on the Middle East and North Africa.