Homeland Missile Defense Is a ‘Must Pay’ Bill

Once again, political and budgetary dysfunction in our nation’s capital threatens our government’s ability to perform its most basic function: to pay for its own operation. Nested within that pending overarching government budget are a myriad of priorities and “must pay” bills, but none is more important than the defense of the homeland against rogue nations’ intercontinental ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons.

In accordance with the deal Congress concluded in June to keep the government operating, if no budget is agreed upon by the early part of next year, a process known as “sequestration” will be triggered, setting into motion a series of budget “cut drills,” the largest and most consequential being within the Department of Defense (DOD).

Because of the rules under a sequestration, these cut drills systemically, historically and disproportionately impact weapons systems modernization programs — some of which are at the top of the DOD’s priorities. They come in an environment of intense pressure upon the DOD as it is called upon to simultaneously support Ukraine and Israel even as it strains to contend with aggression by China, Iran and North Korea.

Congress and the Biden administration cannot fail to consider the very real danger to the homeland posed by these prolific threats, most of which have just recently been addressed by the DOD. While defense against rogue nations’ intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) has been the focus of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) for years, only lately has the department established a viable way ahead for our defense against cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons — both of which are already widely fielded by Russia and China.

Nascent programs such as the Air Force’s Air and Cruise Missile Defense of the Homeland effort and its Over-the-Horizon Radar program are especially vulnerable should Congress stumble into another sequestration. Although much more mature than the others, the MDA’s Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) program, the country’s first line of defense against an Iranian or North Korean long-range missile, could also face crippling cuts without regular order appropriations.

The NGI is the MDA’s most successful effort yet to address shortcomings in our Ground-based Midcourse missile defense system, especially against threats not envisioned when the system was first fielded. After a number of false starts through many years, the MDA decided upon a new approach and issued requests for proposals to industry for a solution.

The MDA selected two teams to compete for the program award. In language inserted into the National Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed that the MDA uphold “fly before you buy” principles. And the Biden administration added funding to the president’s budget request to ensure competition in the development process, through what is known as critical design review.

Conveniently, the critical design review aligns within the DOD’s acquisition process with the developmental test and engineering phase of a program. The MDA has announced its intention to buy 10 developmental missiles, in addition to 21 production items, which could be split between the two teams to test. This would allow the MDA to essentially “wring out” the two competing designs and make a much more informed decision on which to select, while mitigating developmental and production risks.

Sequestration cut drills most often result in a tax of equal amount on all programs of record, regardless of performance — no credit is given to well-performing programs versus failures. These drills aim to cut dollars in any way possible, including discontinuing funding for competition before test results are available, which is shortsighted, penny-wise and pound-foolish.

The nation deserves better. Steady and predictable funding support for defenses against our adversaries’ hypersonic weapons, cruise missiles and ICBMs is the only way to overcome years of lethargy and denial and finally provide the United States a real capability to overcome these threats.

The Air Force’s Air and Cruise Missile Defense of the Homeland Analysis of Alternatives study will point the way toward closing significant gaps in our current ability to detect, target and destroy hypersonic and cruise missiles. New Over-the-Horizon Radars, placed strategically throughout North America, will finally provide an ability to detect, track and engage these low-flying, stealthy cruise and hypersonic missiles.

And finally, the NGI is the MDA’s only opportunity to meet and exceed missile defense requirements versus modern-threat ICBMs for the foreseeable future. It is perhaps the model for a successful DOD acquisition strategy, leveraging competition to exact enhancements in schedule and performance.

Leaders in Washington should not turn back the clock to the failed acquisition practices of the past, which valued short-term marginal savings more dearly than real, credible combat capability at a program’s fielding. Congress and the administration should fully support these programs, and the best way to help ensure that is to avoid myopic budget cuts to key modernization efforts that will better protect the U.S. homeland.

Howard “Dallas” Thompson is a retired U.S. Air Force major general and former chief of staff at North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM).