Democracy Across Eurasia is at Stake in Ukraine

Even though the cost of winning the war in Ukraine has been high, as evidenced by President Biden’s request for $24 billion more in Ukraine aid, the cost of losing the war looms even higher. 

In 1991, after the West and USSR had waged the Cold War for a half-century, communist tyranny finally gave way to a new generation of democracies in former Soviet republics. In the 2000s, color revolutions and emerging civil societies brought another wave of democratic reforms. Post-Soviet countries, like Georgia, Ukraine and Armenia, kept climbing up the global freedom rankings. 

This democratic progress, achieved through decades of revolutions and billions of Western aid dollars, now hinges on the outcome of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Both good and bad actors across the region are watching to see if Ukraine’s democratic experiment will prevail, and whether Western support will remain steadfast. Failure to win and liberate Ukrainian territory would boost the fortunes of autocrats everywhere, demonstrating that, given enough time, aggression will be rewarded. In contrast, Ukrainian victory will empower pro-democracy voices all the way from Eastern Europe to the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. 

Ukrainian victory will disarm pro-Russian forces ideologically by refuting two key premises of Russian imperialism — the invincibility and superiority of Russia. Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko no longer would be able to justify his tolerance of Russia’s encroachment onto Belarus by claiming that Ukrainian resistance is futile. This would provide an opening for the pro-democracy Belarusian forces that oppose Russia’s occupation of their country. Ukraine’s victory also would undermine arguments that Russian fascism is superior to Western liberalism. A democratic Ukraine, with all its territories restored, will show that Western values lead to victory and prosperity, while Russian fascism brings failure. 

A Russian military defeat would empower neighboring countries by alleviating fears of Russian invasion. With a crippled military and devastated economy, Russian adventurism will be curtailed and pro-Russian politicians no longer would have an excuse to cast their lot with the Kremlin in the name of security. Russian officials have deliberately exacerbated these fears: former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev argued in a hastily deleted social media post that Kazakhstan is “a non-existent state” and that Russian borders do not end anywhere. In the Caucasus, Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party explicitly cites a threat of Russian military action as a key reason to distance itself from Ukraine’s war effort and embrace the doctrine of “strategic patience.” 

While Ukrainian victory will help democracy across Eurasia, the people of Moldova and Belarus stand to benefit most. Both countries are polarized between pro-Western and pro-Russian sentiments. The outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian War will impact which camp prevails. Polling last fall showed that, while 63% of Moldovans supported entering the European Union, only 26% supported joining NATO, indicating that Moldova’s pro-Western consensus is still solidifying. In Belarus, the contrast between democratic opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and Lukashenko is even more stark, with the former opposing Russia and the latter growing dependent on the Kremlin. Russia’s defeat would deal a potentially fatal blow to Lukashenko and a boon to all who advocate for a Euroatlantic future in Moldova and Belarus.

States that maintain ambiguity or neutrality with regard to the war in Ukraine, such as Southern Caucasian and Central Asian countries, also could see the strategic value of moving closer to the West after Ukraine’s victory. These countries already have shown their readiness to disassociate themselves from Russia if it is in their interests. After Moscow’s initial onslaught on Kyiv in February 2022 failed, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev refused to recognize the independence of Russian-occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in Vladimir Putin’s presence, humiliating him at Russia’s high-profile economic conference in St. Petersburg. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who historically had sought Russia’s mediation in peace talks with Azerbaijan, recently turned to the EU for mediation and even accused Moscow of failing to fulfill its role as a peacekeeper in Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Finally, by demonstrating the strength of the Western alliance against Russian aggression, Ukrainian victory would make the case for Eurasia to move in a more democratic direction. In Moldova, Belarus and South Caucasian countries, pro-Western political forces are the staunchest advocates of stronger democratic institutions and free elections. In Central Asia, the path to democratization also lies through closer cooperation with the West, as Western governments and investors require democratic reforms in return for closer integration. 

Only a rapid and full Ukrainian victory can bring real democratization and the defeat of pro-Russian sentiments across the post-Soviet space. The longer the war lasts, the more costly democracy and partnership with the West appear. A decisive victory in which Ukraine liberates all of its territory and cripples the Russian military is necessary to assure other post-Soviet countries that Russia will not invade them after Ukraine. Partial victory of Ukraine, in contrast, might leave Russia with an appetite for revenge and the military capability to act on it. 

Ukraine’s democratic pro-Western path is, in many ways, an experiment among post-Soviet countries. Everyone in the region closely follows the war to see if this experiment succeeds. Whether it does is largely in the hands of the West, which needs to provide Ukraine with the military assistance required for victory. 

Stephen Nix is the senior director for Eurasia at the International Republican Institute. Oleksii Antoniuk, who grew up in Ukraine, was a summer intern at the International Republican Institute and has contributed to the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert blog. The opinions expressed here are their own.