We asked Russians how they define ‘victory’ in the war in Ukraine. We got a lot of different answers.

As we approach the anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, both sides insist they will fight to the bitter but victorious end. For the Ukrainians, the meaning of “victory” is clear, but ask Russians to define it, and you get vague and contradictory answers. The stated aims of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation” have shifted often, and the mood of the Russian public has as well.

For Ukrainians, this isn’t complicated. “Victory” means the liberation of their country from Russian invaders.

“I can tell you for sure that if they leave our territory, the war will stop,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in a late-January interview with Sky News. “That’s all it takes.”

The one point of ambiguity has involved Crimea, the territory Russia annexed in 2014. Recapturing Crimea would mean restoring not just the pre-February 2022 reality but the borders that existed nearly a decade ago. But as the Ukrainians have felt emboldened by their resistance — and hardened by the Russian aggression — the return of Crimea has entered into the definition of “victory.” Certainly this is Zelenskyy’s view: nothing less than a return to the borders set in 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

On the Russian side, talk of “victory” is constant.

At a rally to commemorate the (illegal) annexation of Ukrainian territories in September of last year, Putin said, “We have the truth behind us. And in truth is our strength, which means victory. Victory will be ours!” On Dec. 31, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu declared, “Our victory, like the New Year, is inevitable!” “It’s either our victory or World War III” — this was the headline of a video posted by the Kremlin’s propaganda star Margarita Simonyan in January.

But dig deeper and the question arises: What exactly would “victory” look like for Russia? It turns out that the answers depend on where you look — and who you ask.

From the Kremlin, shifting missions

The Russian authorities have struggled from the beginning to define the goals of their war — or what Putin still calls the “special military operation.”

On Feb. 24, 2022, the day of the invasion, Putin said his troops were going in to achieve the “demilitarization” and “denazification” of Ukraine, along with the deliverance of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics from “genocide.” His twin speeches that week — and the columns of tanks that headed for Kyiv — suggested that Russia was aiming to decapitate the Zelenskyy government.

Less than a week later, the goal posts had already shifted. Shoigu declared that the mission was to defend Russia from a NATO invasion. And by the end of March, as the Russian army bogged down along the outskirts of Kyiv, the mission had shrunk. The Ministry of Defense announced that the main aim was the liberation of the Donbas region in the east.

That was just one month of goal-post-shifting, in the history of Putin’s “special operation.”

The pattern has continued. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in April that the war was being fought “to put an end to the reckless expansion and reckless course toward the complete dominance of the United States and other Western countries.” More recently, various Kremlin-backed propagandists have said that “victory” must include an end to Zelenskyy’s rule, a westward pushback of NATO military assets and an end to “Western hegemony.”

So even when you try to ascertain the official Kremlin definition of “victory,” it’s not so easy.

How ordinary Russians define “victory”

I asked several Russian acquaintances what they thought “victory” would look like in Ukraine. I concentrated on people who support the war or know others who do (those who are against the war are less likely to speak, and in any case, “victory” isn’t something they are thinking about). Overall, I was in touch with nearly 100 people — via email, Facebook and other channels.

The answers I received were if anything even more scattered than the Kremlin’s own visions of victory.

One man said victory would come with “the collapse of NATO.” Another said it would be defined by “Ukraine’s refusal to be friends with the West and refusal to develop nuclear weapons.” Another: “Ukraine’s becoming a part of Russia.”

And so it went. Victory meant “the secession of the Donbas,” “bringing to power pro-Russian governments in the West” and “Kyiv’s promise not to persecute Russians.” Perhaps the oddest answer — although given the nature of current Russian propaganda, perhaps I shouldn’t have been surprised: “Stop gay propaganda.”

The responses only piqued my interest to dig more deeply. I turned to other sources — including Russian political scientists, journalists and bloggers. My conclusion? The majority of Russians would define “victory” in one of four ways.

Version 1: Keep the newly captured territories and cut off Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea

Many Russians believe victory involves making permanent Putin’s annexation of Ukrainian land — the four regions in the east and south that were illegally claimed by the Kremlin in September 2022.

Parliamentary Duma Deputy Nikolai Novichkov put it this way:

“It is important to stand our ground. We have annexed four regions, all of which must be included in the Russian Federation in their entirety,” Novichkov said in January. He went on to emphasize the importance of taking the Black Sea ports of Odessa and Nikolayev as well. “Victory should be obvious, so no one will dare question it,” he said. “Everyone will understand that the world has changed.”

Many politicians have made similar arguments based on Russia’s historical claims to these places. An anonymous contributor to the anti-Ukraine site Antimaidan put it this way:

“Thus Ukraine will be cut off from the sea, which will significantly weaken its already ruined economy. After that, Ukraine is unlikely to be able to provide serious military resistance to Russia, which will allow us to occupy the Russian regions without bloody battles.”

Another anonymous voice, this one writing under the heading “Reflections of a Couch Analyst” on Zen, a major Russian platform for bloggers, threw the eastern city of Kharkiv — Ukraine’s second largest — into the mix.

“This is the maximum task. Kyiv, Lviv, even Poltava are not at all necessary … Russia will have enough. Ukraine will be cut off from the sea as a punishment, the collective West will objectively lose.”

These are all “victories” that would reward the Russian aggression, and at the moment they seem highly unrealistic. But they constitute a relatively humane notion of “victory” — at least compared with the others I heard.

Version 2: Destruction of Ukraine’s statehood

On April 22, 2022, a reporter recorded street conversations with ordinary Muscovites in which she asked: “How will the war end?” The answers were posted on “Lachen pishe,” a popular Ukrainian Telegram channel with an audience of more than 1 million.

Here are some excerpts:

“We need to wipe Ukraine off the face of the earth and that’s it! And then add Poland to the heap.”

“Ukraine will become a secondary state that will not decide anything, and we will take this land for ourselves.”

“It seems to me that we will probably take these poor citizens under our wing. I think that Putin will create better living conditions for them.”

Vadim Kirpichev, author of two books and a number of conspiracy articles and a regular contributor to the “Scientific Answer” channel on the Zen platform, believes that any peace treaty between Russia and Ukraine would be tantamount to defeat for Russia. In his view, “victory” means wiping Ukraine off the map.

“The preservation of Ukraine in any form will lead to constant shelling of the border areas, terrorist attacks and the payment of reparations based on the decisions of international courts,” Kirpichev said. “If we spare Ukraine, there will be an American embassy there. … They will stuff the country with weapons, prepare an army. And Russia will get a war again.”

At the same time, Kirpichev said he doesn’t believe the Kremlin is capable of achieving such a “victory.” In November, he blamed Russian leaders for an “unwillingness to win the war” and said a “change of elites” was needed.

Yuri Apukhtin, an analyst with the online publication Voyennoye Obozreniye, a Russian website that actively supports the war, agreed that the goal must be the elimination of the Kyiv “Russophobic regime” (his words) and the destruction of Ukrainian statehood:

“For Russia, which has declared the goal of the operation to ensure its security, victory lies in unconditional capitulation of Kyiv with the cleansing of the ruling regime.”

If such a “capitulation” isn’t possible, then Apukhtin suggested a compromise: destroy the “Ukronazi regime” and seize enough Ukrainian territory so that the country cannot restore its economic and military potential. At most, Apukhtin said, postwar Ukraine should consist only of its central and western regions, where there will be little industry. At that point, the “West will lose interest in this country and the rest of Ukraine will eventually turn into a Russian-controlled enclave.”

Version 3: Punish the West

For some Russians, even these scenarios — the elimination of Ukrainian statehood and plunder of its land — are not enough; “victory” must include the punishment of the West for helping Ukraine.

On Jan. 15, the online world heard from Akhra Avidzba, who was commanding a Russian volunteer unit fighting in eastern Ukraine. Avidzba gave an interview to the Russian propaganda channel Tsargrad-TV in which he said that “for educational purposes,” it would be a good idea for Russia to conquer several European countries.

“I know that for me and my unit, ‘victory’ is a parade in Lviv,” Avidzba said, referring to the largest Ukrainian city in western Ukraine. “But for Russia, which we represent here today, we need to go further. Because the countries that supplied Ukraine with weapons and helped it should also be held accountable. Giving our errant brother a slap on the back of the head and putting him in his place will not punish the others in any way. Therefore, I think it is necessary to bite off something from the Finns, or the Poles.”

The Finns and Poles were likely singled out given both nations’ centuries-old rivalry with Russia; Avidzba didn’t elaborate.

For Tsargrad TV, such radical and expansionist rhetoric is a staple. The platform has aggressively supported the Kremlin and has waged a long-running campaign against dissidents. (I know this from personal experience; the channel regularly compiles a “list of Russophobes,” and in 2016, I was labeled “a Russophobe and a Jewish TV propagandist.” For the record, I am neither a “Russophobe” nor Jewish nor a “propagandist.”)

But today, you can find this kind of talk on less-hardline media as well. The Russian newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets (MK), until recently a liberal publication, is among many that have changed their tune. Polina Petrusevich, who covers international politics for MK, recently raised the following questions, without apparent irony:

“Should Russia, in case of victory, demand reparations from the European Union, which had supplied Kyiv with lethal weapons?” she asked. “Under what conditions could these requirements be met?”

Version 4: Scaling back expectations

In all these scenarios, reality intrudes. And the longer the war drags on, the more it becomes apparent that some Russians — whatever their views — have begun to realize there may be no quick victory of any kind.

Russian soldiers are suffering heavy casualties fighting for slivers of territory in Ukraine. And as the carnage continues, some less ambitious versions of “victory” have begun to surface.

A contributor to Aftershock, a Russian nationalist website, wrote under the nickname KV1 (the KV-1 was a WWII-era Soviet tank) that a total Russian victory is no longer possible. The Russian army cannot occupy Ukraine militarily, he said, adding that it would be expensive to feed “all this ukropopulation” and restore Ukraine’s infrastructure. KV1 also fears that Russia may not be able to cope with the combined forces of the West.

“Compared to NATO, we are already the weaker side,” he said. “And in this situation … for us just to survive, not to lose territory and not to drop the standards of living too much will already be an achievement. Our flag over Brussels and Washington — this clearly cannot happen.”

So KV1 thinks the answer is to force NATO to stop supporting Ukraine. To do so, he said, Russia will need what he described as an “attrition strategy”: On the domestic front, the government must provide for its people and work to ensure that Russians don’t think constantly about the war — thereby avoiding “war fatigue.” As time goes on, he believes the West will suffer knock-on effects of the war and “interest in supporting Ukraine will inevitably fall.”

What matters most: Respect — and fear

One theme runs through all the “victory” scenarios: Russia must have the world’s attention and respect.

This can of course be interpreted in different ways. To some ardent nationalists, the war itself has brought that sort of attention; it has forced the world to follow Russia’s every move and fear what it might do next. Simonyan, the main Kremlin mouthpiece, says often that she is nostalgic for the former might of the USSR and the Russian Empire — and the attention they garnered on the world stage.

Recently, she shared a historical anecdote:

“There is a famous phrase of [Czar] Alexander the Third. Once when he was fishing, he was informed that foreign ambassadors were waiting for him. And he replied that ‘when the Russian Czar is fishing, Europe can wait’. And of course, I dream of just such a country, so that it returns. To make it big, powerful, strong, and, if you like, scary. Because the one who is scary, he can spit and knock you down with one spit.”

That’s a common view in Russia today. Yevgeny Prigozhin, Putin’s former chef and CEO of PMC Wagner, said recently that Russia “should be a great power, not some kind of a regional operator. It should be a country whose word is heard everywhere, even if it is said in a whisper.”

Simonyan and Prigozhin know what buttons to push to rouse and rally the Russian people. For 20 years, the Russians have been told that the U.S. and Europe have humiliated their country, and that most of their problems can be traced to Western-led policies. For all these years, Putin and his entourage have nurtured what you might call a Russian inferiority complex. And so today, most supporters of the war want to restore the greatness of Russia at any cost — hence some of the more outlandish and unrealistic definitions of “victory.”

In small ways, “victory” has already come. The Western press writes about Russia every day; top-tier analysts worry about Putin’s every move. If attention is what Russians are looking for, they are getting plenty of it.

But of course it’s hard to imagine Putin standing before the cameras on the February anniversary of his invasion and saying something like: “We have already won, because the whole world is paying attention to us.” And among the many problems Putin faces — beyond the battlefield — the confusion about “victory” is a significant one. When the people don’t know what their soldiers are fighting for, then “victory” of any kind becomes that much harder to achieve.

An earlier version of this article misstated the ownership of the Zen platform. This version has been corrected.

Tamara Ivanova contributed reporting. Thanks to Lillian Barkley for copy editing this article.