Can China really play a role in ending the war in Ukraine?

Instead of Geneva or Paris or Ankara, might peace in Ukraine be brokered around a negotiating table in Beijing? The news and the rhetoric emanating from President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Moscow this week would suggest as much.

China’s foreign ministry has framed the visit as a peace mission, and Xi has played the part of that mission’s leader. In their meetings Monday, he told Putin, “On Ukraine issue, voices for peace and rationality are building. Most countries support easing tensions, stand for peace talks, and are against adding fuel to the fire.” He added that “China will continue to play a constructive role in promoting the political settlement of Ukraine issue,” according to a Chinese summary. Among the implications: No one else is doing the same.

This follows China’s release of a 12-point position paper last month laying out conditions for peace in Ukraine. The document was light on detail and criticized in Europe and the U.S. for failing to call out Russia’s role as the instigator of the war. Analysts and Western officials have also pointed out that while China hasn’t openly condoned the war, it has never condemned Russia’s invasion nor the alleged atrocities committed by Russian forces. But for Beijing, the document was an opening move in a peace campaign.

Putin, for his part, has signaled willingness to engage with China in its effort. On Monday, Putin told Xi that Russia had carefully studied China’s paper, and following their meetings Tuesday, Putin said, “We believe that many of the provisions of the peace plan put forward by China are consonant with Russian approaches and can be taken as the basis for a peaceful settlement when they are ready for that in the West and in Kyiv.” After which he added: “So far we see no such readiness from their side.”

But there’s the rhetoric in Moscow — from Putin and Xi both — and then there’s the reality playing out 600 miles away, on the battlefields of eastern Ukraine. There, the war rages, by many accounts as brutally as ever. Russia’s recent offensive in the Donbas has failed to take much new territory, and has come at enormous cost in lives to both sides. Ukraine is expected to launch a counteroffensive of its own this spring.

In the early weeks of the war, a negotiated solution to end the fighting looked plausible. Ceasefire talks hosted by the Turkish government in Istanbul seemed to be showing slow but real progress toward a compromise. But that diplomatic process ended after the revelations of the Russian military’s massacre of civilians in the town of Bucha in April. The two sides have held talks since then, usually under U.N. auspices, but these have been limited to issues including prisoner exchanges, nuclear power plant safety, and resuming food exports through the Black Sea. Nothing aimed at ending the fighting itself. Now, with both sides still wholly invested in winning on the battlefield, experts expect neither to push for negotiations.

All of which raises the question: What chance do Xi and China have to play a real role as peacemakers?

What Ukraine and Russia want

Answering that question begins with looking at what demands the two sides would likely bring to the negotiating table — demands that China would have to somehow help reconcile.

It hasn’t always been clear what Putin would consider an acceptable outcome to the war. At the beginning of the conflict, he vowed to “demilitarize and denazify” Ukraine, which implied that he aimed to overthrow Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government and replace it with one more to the Kremlin’s liking. More recently, Putin has said that the goal has always been to “liberate the whole of the Donbas,” referring to the region of eastern Ukraine that has been under partial Russian occupation since 2014. In September, Putin annexed the Donbas, as well as two other provinces outside it — Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Since then, Russia has retreated from much of Kherson, but Putin presumably aims to keep at least some of those territories as well. While Russia has expressed openness to negotiations, the Foreign Ministry has made clear it expects Kyiv to recognize the “new territorial realities” in Ukraine.

Looming over Russia’s calculus is the question of whether Putin believes that a defeat in Ukraine would pose a threat to his rule. If he sees the war as a matter of survival — political or literal — he may be willing to do almost anything to avoid defeat.

For Ukraine, as its military has had surprising success in resisting and then pushing back the Russian invasion, the country’s own war aims have expanded. Early on, the Ukrainians might have been satisfied with pushing Russia back to the territories it controlled in February of last year. Now, the stated goal is to retake all of Ukraine’s internationally recognized territory — that’s a reference to Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014. For all the talk of what might be acceptable “offramps” to Putin, Zelenskyy is constrained by domestic politics as well. Polls show more than 90 percent of Ukrainians define victory as “when all territory lost between 2014 and now is regained, including Crimea.” (A number of Western officials seem very skeptical that Ukraine has a realistic chance of retaking Crimea.)

From Ukraine’s perspective, not only would territorial compromises encourage future Russian aggression, they would also undermine the concepts of territorial integrity and international law.

“There’s no way that Ukrainian people would be able to accept any concessions which would legitimize Russian aggression,” Olha Stefanishyna, a deputy prime minister of Ukraine, recently told Grid. “I don’t think this is in the interest of any party, including NATO itself.”

Zelenskyy has been promoting his own 10-point plan to end the conflict, which in addition to restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity, calls for the establishment of a tribunal to prosecute Russian war crimes. That’s not something the Russian government is likely to agree to.

Enter China?

If any country is to close the yawning gap between Russia and Ukraine at this moment in the war, experts say China may be the best fit — for a variety of reasons.

For one thing, China has clearly nominated itself for the role and has strong motivations of its own for entering the fray. The war, and China’s coziness with Russia throughout, have been “draining China’s diplomatic credibility,” said Yun Sun, China director at the Stimson Center, a D.C.-based think tank. China would like to get back on a better footing with European Union nations, if not the U.S. The economic fallout from the war has also hit China; as China begins its anticipated economic rebound following the “zero-covid” era, the government would certainly appreciate a global tail wind.

And perhaps most importantly, China is looking to boost its global image. “China is trying to frame itself as an emerging and a new peace mediator in the international arena,” Sun said, an effort that was made clear by China’s role in brokering a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia this month. “I think the whole Global South, 80 percent of the Global South, welcomes China’s initiative on this,” Wang Huiyao, president of Center for China and Globalization, a Beijing-based think tank, told Grid.

Experts also told Grid that no other country is a clearer choice at this point.

“China is far from the perfect mediator as it is widely seen as biased toward Russia,” said Cheng Chen, a professor of political science at University at Albany, State University of New York. “At the same time, it is hard to think of one good candidate, as most major powers have taken sides.”

And while its close ties to Russia have been viewed by many in the West as a disqualifier for China as a mediator, that relationship may also be China’s greatest asset.

“If Russia felt China was at the table, they don’t have to face only adversaries,” Wang said. “That will make them more comfortable and make both sides be more rational and make some relaxation of their positions.”

It’s not just about putting Russia at ease, though. Perhaps more important, China holds significant leverage over Russia as its largest trading partner and a critical economic and diplomatic lifeline during the war. In other words, Xi Jinping brings an ability to make demands of Vladimir Putin. That’s not something other leaders have.

“China is probably one of the very few states that can try to convince Russia to reach a certain compromise, and this is why I think Ukraine would still enter such talks if China decides to play a major role,” Marcin Kaczmarski, a lecturer in security studies at the University of Glasgow, told Grid.

China also has a long-standing relationship with Ukraine. Although China-Russia relations have certainly been stronger, China has been Ukraine’s largest trading partner, a commerce based primarily on its imports of Ukrainian iron, grain, and seed oil. While Xi hasn’t spoken to Zelenskyy since Russia invaded, the two are expected to speak soon. The Ukrainian president has welcomed China’s efforts — in principle at least — while emphasizing that a Russian withdrawal was a bottom line for peace.

One more answer to the “Why China?” question: For all the skepticism Xi’s peace mission has generated in the U.S. and Europe, there are many governments around the world that would support negotiations even if they involved a far less confrontational approach to Moscow. As Grid has reported, Putin and Russia are hardly pariahs on the world stage, even after Russia’s invasion and its brutal acts in Ukraine. India, Brazil, South Africa, the nations of the Persian Gulf — these are just some of the influential nations around the globe that would likely support a Chinese-led peace initiative.

The limitations of Pax Sinica

There are a few issues with the China-as-savior scenario. First, China may care less than it appears about leading a negotiation process. Sun argues that China’s top priority is maintaining a good relationship with Russia as a bulwark against the West; brokering peace would be icing on the cake — but not worth pursuing if it upended that relationship. Speaking of Xi’s visit to Moscow, she said, “I think the peacemaking part of it — that’s only an add-on in order to dilute or to neutralize the image of Xi Jinping going to Moscow to support Russia.”

As long as Russia isn’t losing the war, it could be argued that a continuation of the conflict is actually to China’s benefit; for one thing, it keeps the U.S. military focused on the European theater rather than Taiwan and the South China Sea.

“I don’t think that at this stage the Chinese leadership sees the need to push Russia for any solution,” Kaczmarski said.

Even if China has decided that leading a peacemaking effort is a core priority, experts told Grid that China may find it difficult or impossible to wear two hats: neutral mediator and “no limits” friend to Russia. “It is one thing to have leverage, it is another to be willing to actually use it,” said Chen. “Given that China’s relationship with the U.S. and the West has been on a downward trajectory, it is unlikely that China would be willing to put full pressure on Russia on reaching a deal with Ukraine. ”

Again, China’s February position paper points to some of these strains.

“The whole proposal is built around this impression that there is a certain conflict and the two sides should take similar mirroring steps,” said Kaczmarski. “There is no one to blame, they just need to find a solution to this conflict.”

Specifically, many doubt whether China will press Russia forcefully to withdraw from territory it now controls. While China’s position paper did recognize the principle of “respecting the sovereignty of all countries,” and China has never formally recognized Russia’s claim to Crimea or the annexed territories in eastern Ukraine, many experts expressed doubt over how aggressive China would be.

“I think that is the biggest illusion for observers — that somehow China’s is going go to Moscow, and preach for peace, and convince Russia to withdraw,” Sun said.

News from the battlefield may inform China’s next moves. China may be motivated to push harder for peace — and Russian concessions — if its northern neighbor’s fortunes turned.

“For me a kind of starting point would be another successful Ukrainian counteroffensive, but one which would make substantial territorial gains,” Kaczmarski said.

In that event, China might be able to push for some middle ground on the question of territory. Many analysts have argued that Crimea is likely to be out of the question for Russia, but Wang suggested that if the two sides started negotiating, they might consider making the annexed eastern territories autonomous. For his part, Kaczmarski believes China would likely have to convince Russia to return the annexed territories to Ukraine and perhaps hold an internationally supervised referendum in Crimea.

Getting a deal done

Actually brokering such a complicated deal raises another issue: Compared to the U.S., Russia, and several European nations, China has limited experience in mediating conflicts. China facilitated six-party talks with North Korea in the 2000s, which may have slowed the country’s nuclear program, but certainly didn’t succeed in dismantling it. More recently, China helped restore diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but those talks were far more straightforward, Yun said.

Given all of this, it is perhaps most likely that China would be one of many players engaged in a peace process. Others would likely include the EU, U.S. and U.N., and maybe Turkey, experts said.

That said, despite all the caveats and challenges, the experts Grid surveyed said China’s efforts should not be dismissed because — even if those efforts alone don’t lead to a resolution — they could help pave the road to peace. With the war having already claimed hundreds of thousands of casualties and the threat of the use of nuclear weapons always looming, that’s no small thing.

Sun said even small steps are worth pursuing, “If Xi is indeed able to convince the two sides to start a conversation, not even on the highest level, even just on the working level, just starting to talk about the de-escalation of tensions or the deflation of the conflict — if Xi Jinping is able to convince the two sides to have this type of conversation out of his trip, I would consider the trip a success already.”

Cleo Li-Schwartz contributed reporting. Thanks to Dave Tepps for copy editing this article.